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 3 
Introduction 
 
 The end of the Cold War brought hope of a New World Order. 
Democracy, justice and equal opportunities prevailed over evil and a new chapter of the 
History of Humanity was to be written. Before the fruits of victory could even be relished 
a new form of menace threatened international stability, Iraq’s brutal dictator Saddam 
Hussein launched an unprovoked attack at his tiny neighbor Kuwait, thus coming to 
control a quarter of the World’s oil reserves. While Europe was busy uniting, the 
U.S.S.R. disintegrating, China licking its wounds after Tiananmen, the U.S. President 
George H. W. Bush was in the middle of a budget crisis that could have made the U.S. 
military obsolete. To the hawkish conservatives who formed the core of the Bush 
administration the Iraqi aggression was a golden opportunity to give America a victory it 
was craving for since the Vietnam War. However military action wasn’t seen by 
everyone as the only option, a wide specter of politicians in the U.S. and the World were 
opposed to the use of force and preferred to solve the Gulf crisis in a diplomatic fashion.  
 
This thesis will examine who took which stance and where it led. The main goal 
of this paper is also to describe to which extent U.S. policy during the Gulf War was fair 
and balanced, the thesis being: were the Gulf War and its consequences an inevitable 
epilogue in the long chapter of Saddam Hussein’s ruthless regime or a mere excuse by 
hawks in the US trying to sway international politics’ course towards a New World Order 
in a more conservative way?  
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In order to try and answer this question many books, essays, memoirs and papers 
have been published. The most direct sources in which answers can be found are 
probably George H. W. Bush’s A World transformed and James Baker’s Politics of 
Diplomacy. These memoirs give a detailed perspective of decision-making during the 
crisis and are invaluable to understand U.S. policy during the Gulf War. However both 
publications were made public years after the events and tend to defend the politicians’ 
steps instead of critically revaluating specific decisions and moves. On the antipode of 
these opinions is The Gulf War, Overreaction and excessiveness by El-Najjar Hassan, a 
professor at Dalton State College of Georgia. According to this author, the Gulf War 
shouldn’t have taken place at all; it was provoked by some elements in the Bush 
administration that sought the total destruction of Iraq, regardless of Kuwait’s invasion.  
However these 3 books were written by biased authors and need critical assessments in 
order not to make erroneous conclusions. At no point in their publications do George 
Bush and James Baker admit having made the wrong decision. They firmly stand by it, 
arguing for a military intervention, without taking into account or even expressing 
numerous reasons not to attack. Hassan El Najjar on the other hand, strongly criticizes the 
administration’s decision making. Being an American of Palestinian decent, this 
academic views negatively U.S. hegemony in the Middle East regardless of it being 
direct, indirect, legitimate or illegitimate.   
 
The article “Notre ami Saddam” published in the monthly Le Monde Diplomatique 
manages to briefly describe events in Iraq from the beginning of the 1980 War with Iran 
to the 2003 invasion by the U.S. with the recess required. This recess is essential to 
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understanding the Gulf War, being the outcome of a crisis, which finds its roots deeper 
than in the August invasion.  
 
Although the British colonial era left its mark in the history of the Middle East, this paper 
will only go back to the Iran – Iraq War, after which a policy shift by the West in general, 
and the U.S. in particular, can be analyzed. 
“Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad” by Gregory Gause, Associate 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, balances the points of view 
of both mainstream and revisionist historians. Here the invasion of the small Emirate is 
put back in perspective: Kuwait was considered by Saddam Hussein to be Iraq’s 19th 
province and a geo-strategic focal point. First of all Kuwait itself holds 10% of the 
world’s proven oil reserves, secondly Iraq with it’s 15% doesn’t have a quality gateway 
to export the oil. Kuwait and its two islands Warbah and Bubiyan are this gateway. 
Already during the 19th century the British were aware of Kuwait’s geo-strategic 
importance, regardless of the oil it had. Until 1899 it had been part of the Basra vilayet 
(along with Baghdad and Mosul, these former Ottoman provinces became Iraq in 1932), 
however in order to guarantee the route to India, Kuwait was created as a British 
protectorate, independent from the rest of Basra. Since the first oil crisis in 1973, Kuwait 
has become a major contributor to US economy. Until 1980, $55 billion were invested 
abroad from oil surplus only. However, all Middle Eastern finances in Europe and North 
America weren’t an investment per se; between 1985 and 1995 $186 billion were spent 
on weapons 1. This volatile region is and has long been a gold mine for arms dealers from 
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around the World. During the Iran Iraq War, Baghdad became dependent not only on 
Gulf finances but more important, on Western political and military support. 
 
I. U.S. Policy prior to the Invasion 
 
1.1 Iran – Iraq War 
 
The second half of the 1970s was marked by positive relationship between Iraq 
and Iran. This was made possible thanks to the 1975 Algiers Accord which put an end to 
Iranian support of a Kurdish autonomy uprising in Iraq, in return, Saddam Hussein, then 
Iraqi Vice-President, agreed to a new delimitation of boundaries between the two 
countries (the line would be drawn at the thalweg, meaning in the middle of the maritime 
boundary of the Shatt Al Arab) 2. However millennium old antagonism between Babylon 
and Persia took over again with the 1979 revolution in Teheran and the ousting of the 
pro-Western Shah. The new leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini was still bitter because of 
his past experience with the Iraqis. In 1964 he sought refuge in Iraq because of his 
opposition to the Shah, but the 1975 Algiers Accord prevented Baghdad from supporting 
revolutionary movements against the regime of Teheran therefore Khomeini had to leave 
Iraq. He fled to France where he led the revolution until his triumphant (and bloody) 
return to Iran as the new leader 3. The spiritual leader of the Iraqi opposition Al-Da’wa, 
Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, sent to Teheran a telegram congratulating Khomeini and 
expressing support to the new regime. He also stated that “other tyrants still remain, for 
whom judgment day hasn’t arrived yet” explicitly aiming at Saddam Hussein.  
 7 
The level of tension between the two countries was all the more heightened by the 
unsolved Gulf islands and Khuzestan – Arabistan region issues which hadn’t been solved 
as agreed upon in 1975 4. Between October and November 1979 the Iraqi consulate in 
Khorramshahr was attacked four times. In retaliation, Saddam Hussein had the Iranian 
consulates in Basra and Karbala closed 5. On March 31st Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a 
speech in which he stated, “That Iranians had to do whatever they could to export the 
revolution to other parts of the World” and a week later he called upon Iraqis to 
overthrow their regime. The most evident violation of the 1975 Algiers Accord by Iran 
was the support of the Iraqi opposition organization Al-Da’wa that on April 1st attempted 
to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. Between the Revolution in February, 
and July of 1979 Iran had “conducted 244 land, air, and naval violations and attacks 
against Iraq” after which, war became inevitable 6.  
 
Saddam Hussein was the first to make a real move, whether it was provoked or 
not is not an issue, the matter of the fact remains that he perceived the 1975 Algiers 
Accord as blackmail from the part of the Iranians: delimitate new boundaries giving Iran 
more seashore and islands, in return it would stop supporting Kurdish rebellion in eastern 
and northern Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi President thought Iran weak after the revolution 
had dismembered its army and political structures. By waging a victorious war against his 
neighbor he would not only put an end to the Shiite opposition at home but would boost 
his prestige around the Arab world. Under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, no military 
advisor would dare remind his President of basic facts that make his plans seem 
unrealistic. First of all Iran was four times more populated than Iraq, secondly the two 
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countries shared a 1300km border and finally the capital Teheran was 650km from the 
Iraqi border. In such circumstances, it was obvious that the battle wasn’t won in advance 
for the Iraqis 7. The Iran - Iraq War can be divided into five main periods: the Iraqi 
offensive, the Iranian human wave response, the tankers war, the Karbala offensive and 
in between all these phases, a perpetual stalemate. 
 
Until March of 1981 the Iraqi army went from victory to victory, seldom facing 
stiff opposition, it soon occupied the city of Khorramshahr and most of the southwestern 
province of Khuzestan - Arabistan. Iran was on the defensive and had to mobilize its 
population. Poorly armed and trained, the Iranians had to be at least motivated. The 
conflict was to become a crusade to liberate the mother country from the “Satan of 
Baghdad” 8. Iran adopted a human wave tactic making Iraqi material superiority futile. 
Soon the Iranians were on the offensive. By July of 1982 they had reached the outskirts 
of the southern Iraqi city Basra. By then, many countries in the West and in the Gulf 
started worrying about a possible Iranian victory, which would have had unthinkable 
consequences. U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld as special envoy to 
Iraq. His mission was to renew cooperation in order to help Saddam Hussein stand 
ground against the Iranian advance. Kuwait also started supporting Iraq by allowing it to 
export its oil through Kuwaiti pipelines and tankers, in retaliation Iran started engaging in 
the tankers war. The two belligerents attempted to cripple the other country’s economy 
by preventing it from exporting oil. Thus a tactic of sinking oil tankers was adopted, 
however very fast Iraqi and Kuwaiti tankers started flying under U.S. and Soviet flags 
and traveled with military escort 9. The Soviet Union also renewed its weapons sale to 
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Iraq calculating that it would be easier to deal with Iraq owing it for the weapons than 
with a victorious fundamentalist Iran. In the summer of 1983 France delivered Iraq its 
high-tech Exocet missiles and Super Etandard fighter planes 10.  
 
The United States officially renewed diplomatic contact with Iraq on October 27th 
1984, even though they had already been cooperating before. American firms delivered 
Iraq many chemical materials that would be used as weapons, amongst others, to counter 
the Iranian advance in the southern Iraqi Faw (Fao) peninsula. After the chemical attacks, 
the Iranian political leaders accepted a cease-fire in July of 1988 11.  
The war cost Iraq 150,000 lives and $450 billion in damaged infrastructure; it owed $85 
billion to numerous countries. Iran lost 300,000 lives and suffered $640 billion in 
damage. Ending in a status quo ante bellum, this war was one with “neither victor nor 
vanquished” which in retrospective was in the interest of everyone, except the two 
countries at war 12. 
 
1.2 Western policy shift 
 
Western Europe, the U.S. and the Gulf states saw Iraq as a wall protecting them 
from Iran’s fundamentalism. It is not until the end of the war in 1988 that they realized 
the potential threat that Baghdad represented. The president of Iraq Saddam Hussein went 
as far as developing his own weapons building system. At that point it became obvious 
that a change of policy was necessary. In March of 1990 Mossad agents murdered the 
Canadian engineer Gerald Bull who was building the “Babylon Super Gun” for Iraq 13. 
This device was supposed to enable the Iraqi Army to put in orbit its own satellites, or 
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even worse, launch medium and long-range missiles. In March 1989 the canon 
successfully fired a 500kg explosive charge on a target 1000km away 14. After the death 
of the super canon’s designer, many countries including the United Kingdom and Turkey 
intercepted shipments destined to Iraq, the cargoes contained parts that would have been 
used to finish the “super gun”. Also in the United Kingdom on March 1989, Iraqi 
prominent arms dealer Ali Daghir was arrested; delivering Iraqi weapons import a serious 
blow.  
This was seen by Saddam Hussein as part of an international effort to undermine Iraq’s 
reconstruction after the war. In fact, Western analysts and policy makers decided to take 
action before it was too late, just like Israel did in 1981 when it bombarded the French-
built nuclear installation Osirak south of Baghdad (Operation Opera) 15. Only this time, 
Iraq did actually have the missiles it needed to transport nuclear warheads. After years of 
research and engineering, the Soviet made Scud missiles were transformed into medium 
range ballistic missiles. Two versions were completed, in 1987 the “Al-Hussein” which 
could fly 600km and in 1989 the “Al-Abed” which went as far as 2000km 16.  On 
December 9th 1989 US officials told reporters that Iraq’s missile program had become a 
“subject of major concern” to the Bush administration 17.  
 
To prevent Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, the West decided to exert a 
weapons embargo on Iraq. Saddam Hussein however grew even more defiant, appearing 
on television with two cryotrons in his hands 18, an original one made in the US and an 
Iraqi version. He tried to demonstrate that Iraq had become self sufficient in weapons 
development and didn’t need the West anymore.  However theatrical, this scene did make 
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Western politicians uneasy, and weapons manufacturers angry. During the 1989 Baghdad 
Arms Fair, Iraq proudly displayed the replicas it was developing from weapons it had 
obtained during the Iran – Iraq War. The French Chief-of-staff, General Maurice 
Schmidt, later publicly expressed his discontent, warning that France “had better begin 
paying closer attention to what the Iraqis were developing in the way of armament” 19. 
The Iraqi president was aware of the risk he was taking but felt he had no choice, he was 
seeing history repeating itself and knew he had to take action; actually even Iraqi 
intelligence was sending signals of an imminent attack. The question remained, where 
from? Saddam Hussein’s position was at risk as much from home as from abroad. The 8 
year long war with Iran had only bought him time, his position certainly wasn’t stronger 
and Saddam Hussein knew that. His paranoia of losing grip on power made him see 
danger and enemies everywhere, from the U.S., Israel, his Gulf neighbors and most 
importantly, from his own entourage 20. The Iraqi President regarded these parties’ steps 
as an orchestrated conspiracy against him and his country. However illogical this theory 
may appear, the naked facts do seem as if the tide had turned against Saddam Hussein.  
 
The U.S. for one had changed its attitude vis-à-vis the Iraqi president. In its 1988 
report, the WINEP had warned the Bush administration of the danger an armed Iraq 
represented 21. Drafted by Dennis Ross and Richard Haass, the policy paper forecast 
aggressive Iraqi hegemony in the region, Kuwait being the first step, followed by Saudi 
Arabia and then Israel. Dennis Ross went as far as changing the Secretary of State’s 
policy towards Iraq. Along with Bob Kimmit, he convinced James Baker to change from 
the carrot to the stick. This change of policy was sent on to the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, 
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April Glaspie. Along with the other steps taken in the course of 1990 (limitation of grain 
sale and weapons sale, critics of Iraqi human rights activities, joint U.S. – U.A.E. military 
exercise in the Gulf, etc.) these have probably convinced Saddam Hussein that the U.S. 
was shifting from ally to foe 22.  
Although given actions do lead to this conclusion, in 1990 the shift wasn’t followed by 
any warnings to Iraq itself. In the 1990 N.S.C. Report, there was no mention of Iraq or 
even Kuwait, be it as a strategic ally or potential threat. On July 23rd, State Department 
spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler mentioned that the U.S. “had no defense treaty with 
Kuwait; no special defense or security commitment to Kuwait” 23. This message was 
repeated one week later by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
John Kelly, who also stated that the U.S. was indifferent to the Iraq – Kuwait border 
dispute 24. An assertion emphasized again on July 25th by Ambassador April Glaspie 
during her meeting with Saddam Hussein. She went as far as saying that “We have no 
opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker 
has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the 
Kuwait issue is not associated with America”, the Ambassador did however mention that 
border, and other, issues should be resolved peacefully 25.  
 
Ambassador Glaspie has since been harshly criticized for not being tough on Saddam 
Hussein during their meeting. The Iraqi President is said to have taken it as a “green 
light” to invade Kuwait. Actually April Glaspie only followed instructions from the State 
Department and spoke in common diplomatic language. It is the U.S. policy as a whole 
that should have been criticized for sending the Iraqi President contradictory signs. 
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1.3 Kuwait and Iraq prior to the invasion 
 
Mixed signals were being sent from Washington at a time when Saddam Hussein 
was openly complaining about Kuwait’s “economic war” against Iraq. During the Iran -
Iraq War, Baghdad’s military effort was financed, as mentioned above, mainly by 
neighboring Gulf States. In 8 years, Iraq ended up owing a total of $85 billion to its 
former allies, $12 billion of which it owed to Kuwait 26. While King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia wrote off most of the Iraqi debt in recognition of the protection it offered in the 
face of Iran, Kuwait on the contrary began pushing for reimbursement. A task impossible 
to complete for Iraq, which was one step from bankruptcy after a long and devastating 
war. An objective all the more difficult to achieve with Kuwait violating OPEC quotas 
that caused oil prices to plummet. The Iraqi president calculated that the drop in price 
cost Iraq $14 billion, finances the country badly required 27. As if this was not enough, 
Saddam Hussein began accusing Kuwait of “slant drilling” Iraqi oil in the bordering 
Rumaila area.  
 
Some steps had been taken to deescalate the situation with Iraqi, Kuwaiti and numerous 
third party mediators (Yasser Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, Saudi King Fahd, Jordanian King 
Hussein, etc.) trying to find a compromise. Talks were held on July 31st in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia, in order to resolve the border, oil and loan issues 28. These talks lead nowhere.  
The Iraqi demand of erasing debts, accumulated during the Iran - Iraq War, was used in 
return by Kuwaitis demanding Iraqi recognition of definite borders. 
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No compromise was possible in such a climate, especially given the tone with which the 
Kuwaiti emissary negotiated. He ended the talks by provoking the Iraqis to “ride their 
highest horses” in other words, defying them in combat 29. This stance from the Kuwaitis 
was unusually provocative given the circumstances, after all Iraq had protected them 
from Iran’s fundamentalism, was 20 times larger with 10 times more inhabitants and had 
a 1 million man strong army with years of combat experience. 
When all talks, warnings and threats had failed, Saddam Hussein decided to invade 
Kuwait. As the former French ambassador to Iraq described it, “for Saddam Hussein, it 
had become a question of life or death. As his threats had taken the situation nowhere, he 
sent his troops to the Kuwaiti border.” 30 The invasion took place during the night of 
August 1st 1990 and was completed in a matter of hours. The Kuwaiti emir fled to Saudi 
Arabia where he formed the government-in-exile. 
 
II. After the invasion 
 
The reaction of the United States to the invasion was immediate. President 
George H. Bush issued an Executive Order to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the U.S., 
Westminster did the same in the United Kingdom and eventually U.N. Resolution 660 
included freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets 31. President Bush also ordered troops to 
move in the Gulf region and adopted a two track - strategy: to sanction Iraq and give 
ultimatums while moving in forces. US Military Command put down a list of targets to 
be destroyed in case of a military action against Iraq.  
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger reminded the Policy Paper which 
foresaw the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and stressed that Saddam Hussein’s next steps 
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would be Saudi Arabia and Israel. He insisted on the use of force as the only means of 
countering the predicted Iraqi hegemony. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Colin Powell raised the question whether there was an alternative to the use of force, 
Lawrence Eagleburger reiterated that Saddam Hussein would not comply and evoked 
chapter 7 of the UN Charter 32. Since the creation of the organization in 1945, the U.S. 
resorted to this chapter only once in the past, during the Korean War in 1950. 
At that point James Baker was also hesitating to bury a peaceful solution, his stance 
changed for good on November 29th after the U.N. vote, hereupon he believed his role 
was “to help wage war and win it” 33.  
President Bush also wasn’t convinced from the beginning of the necessity to solve the 
crisis with force. On the first day of the invasion he answered he “was not contemplating 
intervention” 34 to journalists asking whether the U.S. was seeking military action against 
Iraq. Although he later explained that he didn’t wish to inform the public of an issue that 
sensitive during an interview, the fact remains that at that point he “had no idea what 
(his) options were” 35.  
 
On August 2nd he met British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who lectured him of her 
military, and political, success in the Falklands crisis. He was told not to hesitate or get 
“wobbly” under whatever pressure he was. Later on the Iron Lady continued pressuring 
George H. Bush to take action soon, reminding of the upcoming Muslim holy month of 
Ramadan, which was to be followed by the Hajj and coarse heat. This left, according to 
the prime minister, little time to react 36.  
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President Bush and his advisors quickly sought a U.N. resolution to condemn the Iraqi 
aggression. This resolution was supposed to have two sine qua non points: first, Iraq was 
to withdraw unconditionally and second, any means necessary were to be used to get Iraq 
out of Kuwait in case it didn’t comply 37. These steps were following a plan sketched by 
Richard Haass. According to this plan, the US should put together a broad coalition that 
would liberate Kuwait and punish Iraq under the authority of a U.N. resolution. This plan 
however, also stressed that the formation of a coalition and even a U.N. resolution were 
not mandatory. If necessary, the US would have to act solo 38. It remains a question to 
which extent President Bush would have followed this plan, had the U.N., or even the 
coalition members, been reluctant to back the U.S. Either way, the matter of the fact 
remains that both conditions were met, in great part thanks to the Secretary of State 
James Baker’s politics of diplomacy. 
 
2.1 Bakerian Politics of Diplomacy 
 
The Secretary of State’s first step was to acquire the necessary funds to wage the 
upcoming war. He visited Saudi King Fahd and Kuwaiti Emir Sabah from whom he got 
guarantees they would pay all war-related expenses, including weapons, oil, water and 
food supplies amounting to $100 billion. These visits were called the “tin cup” tour.  
Next, James Baker insured the political and military backing of Arab countries. Amongst 
them was Egypt, lead by President Hosni Mubarak, a U.S. ally and personal friend. 
 The Secretary of State required President Mubarak to “take a firm stance”, thus Egypt 
ended up supporting the U.S. even in its military operations against Iraq, a fellow Arab 
country. In return, Egypt’s $7 billion debt towards the U.S. was forgiven 39.  
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Syria became part of the coalition against its neighboring fellow Ba’ath regime country, 
for which it obtained $3 billion from the Gulf countries and the U.S. deleted it from the 
State Sponsored Terror List 40. Turkey enabled the coalition to make use of its strategic 
air bases, by being part of the coalition it obtained $1.6 billion from the Gulf States, got 
the $1.5 billion loan it had been seeking from the World Bank and was also promised US 
and British support for its bid to enter the E.E.C. 41  
 
This same procedure was repeated amongst members of the UN Security Council 
to pass resolution 678, the most severe resolution adopted since the beginning of the 
crisis, it called upon Iraq to withdraw by January 15th 1991, or else “all means necessary” 
would be employed to liberate Kuwait 42. Permanent member China badly needed 
recognition from the U.S. after the Tiananmen massacre. James Baker got Chinese 
abstention in return of a U.S. delegation visit to Beijing. Malaysia first expressed its 
disagreement with the U.S. double standard policy towards Iraq and Israel. While the 
latter had been occupying Arab territory since 1967 violating U.N. Security Council 
resolutions 446 and 497, Iraq was being threatened for the very same sin. James Baker 
dismissed the Malaysian Foreign minister Abu Hassan Omar’s remarks as unfounded and 
threatened that “future relations with the United States would be affected” after which the 
latter sat dead silent. The only two members of the U.N. Security Council, which did not 
bow to U.S. pressure, were Cuba and Yemen. Although the Cuban Foreign Minister 
Isidoro Malmierca Peoli was threatened his country risked “being isolated” if it vetoed 
the resolution, his vote remained negative. The Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
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took the same decision and voted negatively, this act cost Yemen its annual $70 million 
humanitarian aid from the U.S. 43  
 
Just like it did on the diplomatic front, the Bush administration waged war against 
Saddam Hussein at home, on the media front. President George H. Bush started a tour of 
American states to gain the backing of Senators and citizens. During the rallies he often 
compared Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler, reminding of the Fuhrer’s invasions that 
never stopped. Obviously this time, the U.S. President was not going to adopt a policy of 
appeasement. That is why the Geneva Meeting of November 29th can certainly not be 
compared to the Munich Conference of September 29th 1938. The Geneva Meeting lasted 
6 hours and involved U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz, during which the U.S. envoy conveyed the “four no’s” to his Iraqi 
counterpart. President Bush expressed there would be “no negotiations, no compromise, 
no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression” in a letter designated to the 
Iraqi President. Tariq Aziz refused to hand over such a letter to his President citing that it 
contained nothing but “threats” 44.  
Intended to be a peace conference, the Geneva Summit ended up being a fruitless 
meeting where the only shared information were the rules of engagement. In hindsight, it 
also seems as if it was intended to show U.S. politicians who were opposed to war, that 
everything had been done to prevent it and that the Iraqi President was the sole 
responsible for the failure of diplomatic negotiations. 
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 “Cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the 
politics of diplomacy.” 45 This tactic, which is more political than diplomatic, can have 
only two consequences. First, the U.N. resolutions and the coalition will not reflect 
collective will of countries from around the World. Secondly, the U.N. which was the 
basis of the resolutions will be tarnished and lose credibility. In order to gain shortsighted 
support, the Bush administration sacrificed this organization that was supposed to 
platform international diplomacy in the New World Order. 
 
2.2 1990 Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearings 
 
The entire U.S. political spectrum was not determined to go to war. James Carter was the 
father of the Rapid Deployment Forces, which had the sole mission of swiftly responding 
to any kind of threats to American interests, mainly in the Middle East. This was part of 
the Carter Doctrine, aimed at countering Soviet influence which was rising in this oil rich 
strategic region. However, in 1990, the former U.S. President and Nobel Peace prize 
laureate, wrote a letter to the U.N. Security Council urging it not to pass a resolution that 
would authorize the use of force. According to him, such action would lead to vast lost of 
human lives, serious economic consequences and permanent destabilization of the 
Middle East 46. Very similar arguments were repeated during the 1990 Senate Armed 
Forces Committee Hearings.   
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia summoned these hearings on September 11th, November 
27th and December 3rd 1990. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was the first to speak 
stating the economic aspect of the invasion. He reminded that it was the United State’s 
duty to protect its interests abroad, which in this case included oil. In fact the invasion 
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had caused the “third energy crisis” with oil prices soaring up to $40.42 per barrel. As the 
Secretary of Defense described it, this shock was damaging the global, and U.S., 
economy 47. The hearing itself was opened by Dr. James Schlesinger who urged for 
patience, explaining in detail that sanctions took time to work; in Iraq’s case a period of 6 
months would be necessary. He was followed by General Norman Schwarzkopf who 
shared the same message, reminding there was absolutely nothing glorious about war. 
Senator Kennedy took stance confirming Dr. Schlesinger’s arguments; in his analysis 
Iraq was losing $1.5 billion each month because of the sanctions. Thus Iraq’s economy 
was recessing at a rate of 5% per month, which evidently left little time before the effects 
of the sanctions would be felt. Admiral Crowe also mentioned the necessity to give the 
sanctions time to work. In his opinion, any U.S. intervention in the Middle East would 
have a destabilizing effect, arousing great anti-American feelings and creating irreparable 
damage in the region. Military strategist James Webb criticized the possibility of a 
“premature, unprovoked ground offensive” which should be instead replaced by a mutual 
withdrawal by U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and Iraqi troops from Kuwait. According to 
James Webb, this would have been the face-saving exit Iraq was seeking, and would be 
in accordance with U.S. interests.  
 
Edward Luttwak from the Center of Strategic and International Studies also advised 
reducing the number of troops in the region, not increasing them. In his testimony he also 
predicted that an air campaign would be followed by a ground attack totally annihilating 
Iraq’s military machine. His prediction proved true. Middle East expert Christine Helms 
repeated the argument described by Admiral Crowe that a U.S. intervention would 
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certainly be a victory from a military point of view (in the short term at least) but would 
destabilize the Middle East in the medium and long term with “economic, political and 
military problems […] extending far beyond Iraq and Kuwait”. In her opinion, the 
sanctions in place were the solution to avoiding these future problems. This point of view 
was, once again, repeated by Dr. Phoebe Marr who warned that a war against Iraq would 
turn much of its population, and the Arab world, against the U.S. Dr. Marr mentioned this 
fact in various points. First of all she reminded an argument cited above concerning what 
is perceived in the Arab world as the double standard U.S. policy towards Iraq’s 
occupation of Kuwait and Israel’s occupation of Palestine, south Lebanon and part of 
Syria. Secondly she explained the lack of reaction by Arab countries in the beginning of 
the crisis, being seen as the outcome of a sorrow disparity between large poor countries 
and small Gulf monarchies, viewed as wealthy beyond imagination. Finally, U.S. 
occupation of Middle Eastern land would be used as a pretext by nationalists and 
fundamentalists in their quest against democratic and liberal regimes.  
A compromise was proposed by Lt. General Williams, who suggested keeping the forces 
already in place to exert pressure, but not to intervene in order to give sanctions the time 
needed for them to work 48.  
 
Arguments given for an intervention were suggested by Senator Al Gore, Dr. Henry 
Kissinger and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. According to Al 
Gore, the embargo may take too long to work, making it possible for an even more 
dangerous situation to unfold. The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized 
the need to reduce “Iraq’s offensive capability, which now overshadows its neighbor’s 
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capabilities” and also mentioned the need to keep the embargo and sanctions against Iraq 
in place, but after a military intervention. Richard Perle expressed his opposition to 
sanctions stating that they would not eradicate the Iraqi threat 49. These arguments seem 
to omit the very reason of the Committee Hearings: the invasion of Kuwait.  
On December 3rd the Committee Hearings were concluded with statements by Richard 
Cheney and Colin Powell. The Secretary of Defense warned of the danger of waiting too 
long, according to him it was “far better for us to deal with Saddam now, while the 
coalition is intact, while we have the United Nations behind us […] than it will be for us 
to deal with him 5 or 10 years from now”. On the other hand, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell reiterated that “the mission was not to punish or retaliate” at 
Iraq and summoned both parties’ points of view: sanctions do need time to work and the 
military will be ready in 4, 10 or 18 months just as it is today, however sanctions will 
have worked only once Saddam Hussein will have withdrawn from Kuwait 50.  
 
2.3 Iraqi withdrawal proposals 
 
Less than a week after invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein proposed a withdrawal 
plan. His demand was the same as prior to the invasion: better access to the Gulf waters 
and renegotiation of oil prices which would be, according to him, acceptable. As this 
proposal did not meet the UN resolution’s “unconditional” term, it was rejected 51. One 
day later, on August 12th another withdrawal proposal was rejected, this time because the 
Iraqi president linked two problems: the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli 
occupation of Arab lands. A month later, on September 9th, the Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev mediated a third withdrawal proposal: Iraq was to release all the hostages it 
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was holding and completely withdraw from Kuwait, in return Saddam Hussein asked a 
peace conference on the Middle East. Once again it was rejected because of the linkage 
with the Israeli conflict (which would have been addressed during the conference).  
Even when UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar visited George H. Bush in 
Camp David on January 5th he was denied the possibility to mediate a peaceful solution. 
This time President Bush openly admitted he did not want to give “Saddam hope that he 
could find another way out” 52. Three days before the Air Campaign phase of operation 
Desert Storm begun, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas tried one last 
initiative to avoid war. He offered to organize a peace conference on the Middle East in 
return Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait. As most previous peace initiatives, President 
Bush refused it because of the linkage with the Israeli conflict. 
 
After the Coalition bombardment began the Iraqi president continued proposing to 
withdraw. The first attempt was mediated by the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksander 
Bessmertnykh on January 26th 1991 during his meeting with his U.S. counterpart James 
Baker. The Secretary of State refused to accept the terms because they would have 
allowed Saddam Hussein to “withdraw his military intact” 53 which seemed to have 
eventually become contrary to U.S. interests. The next initiative was taken by Yevgeny 
Primakov, member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Presidential Council and Soviet Special 
Envoy to Iraq. During his visit to Baghdad he met Saddam Hussein and convinced the 
Iraqi President to withdraw unconditionally, for practical and logistical reasons it could 
be done only in a fixed period of time, not overnight. In exchange, he promised a cease-
fire. George H. Bush’s answer was his famous statement “No way, Jose” a statement 
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which very well describes the U.S. President’s attitude towards his Iraqi counterpart 54. 
According to James Baker, the U.S. President had to reject this offer for three reasons, 
first of all they couldn’t let Saddam Hussein gain any political credit from the crisis, 
secondly James Baker suspected the Soviet administration of exaggerating the Iraqi 
President’s offer and most important the Soviets hadn’t consulted the U.S., “not even in 
private” 55. President Bush rejected a third proposal suggested by Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz during his visit to Moscow on February 18th. Although the U.S. Secretary of 
State admitted that Saddam Hussein “was beginning to behave as though he genuinely 
feared a ground attack” and that “Gorbachev’s plan contained some new elements” it still 
“fell well short” of what President George H. Bush saw as an acceptable solution 56.  
 
On February 22nd, two days before the ground offensive, Saddam Hussein finally 
agreed to an unconditional retreat and abandoned the linkage with the Israeli conflict. 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev called President Bush and explained the plan in 
detail. Although it met all points the two Heads of State had agreed upon before, 
including withdrawing in accordance with U.N. resolution 660, George H. Bush rejected 
the plan at which point his Soviet counterpart asked “what is our priority?” a question full 
of irritation, resulting from permanent U.S. refusal no matter what the conditions were 57. 
For George H. Bush, it all came to a point where he didn’t trust President Saddam 
Hussein anymore and wanted to punish him for his scorched-earth tactic in Kuwait. 
Again, this is far from the initial withdraw from Kuwait rhetoric. According to Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz “Iraq was designed by George Bush for destruction, with or 
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without Kuwait, inside or outside Kuwait, before the 2nd of August or after the 2nd of 
August” 58  in the same spirit as Cato the Elder’s Carthago delenda est. 
 
2.4 Operations Desert Storm and Desert Saber 
 
After Operation Desert Shield successfully protected Saudi Arabia, came 
Operation Desert Storm. This first part of the attack against Iraq was conducted from the 
air. The bombarding campaign started on the night of January 17th 1991 and lasted until 
February 24th when the second phase began. During the Air Campaign, a total of 100.000 
sorties were conducted, approximately 84% of which by the USAF, in second position 
came Saudi Arabia with 6%. Contrary to popular belief, most bombs used were not the 
“smart” ones the Allied Commanders were praising on CNN, actually only 7% of all 
bombs were the hi-tech and precise smart bombs. A total of 88.500 tons of bombs were 
fired at Iraq and Kuwait 59. On January 18th Iraq fired Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia 
and Israel in a desperate attempt to drag the Jewish State in the war, which would have 
probably fractured the Coalition. Even though “a total of 74 people died as a consequence 
of Scud attacks. Two died in direct hits, four from suffocation in gas masks and the rest 
from heart attacks” 60 the Israeli Defense Force did not respond to Iraq’s provocation, 
thus maintaining the Coalition bound to destroy the Iraqi Army. This was Saddam 
Hussein’s second blowback. First he grossly violated the Geneva Convention by holding 
Western diplomats as hostages and human shields. It seems he wanted to use them as 
bargaining chips to raise his gains from the crisis; however the exact opposite happened 
as he lost all credibility, even in the eyes of his former allies. 
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The hostages were eventually released by December but the harm had been done as Iraq 
was perceived as a rogue state using terrorist methods.  
Operation Desert Saber began on February 24th with an extensive ground offensive 
coming from the Saudi territory. Iraqi troops were outflanked by Coalition forces and 
stuck between attacks from the south and west border, in a maneuver called “the left 
hook”, their only exit was to flee north back into Iraq. During their meeting in Geneva, 
James Baker guaranteed Tariq Aziz that “Americans don’t shoot their adversaries in the 
back” 61 , however, this second phase of the operations caused 200.000 Iraqi casualties, 
many of which were killed while retreating on highway 9 leading from Kuwait City to 
Basra. This route was nicknamed the “Highway of Death” by journalists as they 
uncovered the damage done. Even Airmen nicknamed the operation a “Turkey shoot” as 
it was so easy for them to track down and eliminate Iraqi soldiers 62. 
 
A cease-fire was declared on March 2nd in compliance with U.N. resolution 686. 
The same day a major uprising erupted in the southern and northern parts of Iraq. 
Encouraged by the U.S., these uprisings were conducted by Kurds and Shiites who 
strongly opposed Saddam Hussein’s regime. By March 24th Kurdish Peshmerga fighters 
controlled almost all of Iraqi Kurdistan including the cities of Arbil and oil rich Kirkuk 63 
 In the south, the Shiite’s thirst for revenge after decades of Sunni ruthless repression 
exploded in the massacre of Ba’athist officials and their families in Basra, Nadjaf and 
Karbala. Baghdad’s reprisal was staunch. Republican Guard units quickly reacted to the 
events even though they had just been crushed by the Coalition. Iraqi Army helicopters 
bombarded Kirkuk and Sulaymania in the north and Shiite strongholds in the south, 
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provoking the escape of 2.5 million Kurds to neighboring Iran (eventually to Turkey 64) 
and the death of up to 300.000 Shiites. In April the U.N. imposed a “security belt” north 
of the 36th parallel where Iraqi forces could not enter, thus enabling the Kurds to establish 
a de facto autonomic government. In the south, a “no fly zone” was established under the 
33rd parallel to prevent the massacre of more Shiites. Despite these steps, the Coalition 
did not live up to the Iraqi opposition’s expectations by not supporting them topple 
Saddam Hussein 65. 
 
2.5 Gulf War aftermath 
 
Passed on October 11th 1991, U.N. Security Council resolution 715 gave the 
International Atomic Energy Agency authorization to search and destroy all Iraqi nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons. Eventually, the U.N. even imposed a permanent 
control of Iraqi installations that could potentially build weapons of mass destruction 66.  
The embargo imposed before the beginning of hostilities towards Iraq was not lifted and 
soon became a major humanitarian concern for the whole world. Therefore Iraq was 
allowed to sell $1 billion worth of oil per 90 days, for which it could purchase harmless 
basic needs and food. 30% of the income however had to be turned over to the 
Compensation Fund for damages caused during the war 67. On August 1994 the chief of 
the UNSCOM mission Rolf Ekeus declared himself satisfied with the Iraqi disarmament, 
with surveillance equipment installed and running. Soon U.N. Security Council 
permanent members China, Russia and France started calling for the partial lift of the 
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embargo, a call ignored by the U.S. which managed to prolong it for another 2 months, 
just as it had been doing for the past 4 years 68.  
 
One problem that prevented the embargo lifting was the Iraqi refusal to recognize 
the border suggestion proposed by the U.N. However resolution 687, under which the 
embargo was implemented, didn’t put this as a condition to the lifting. All the other 
conditions were met by Iraq. This embargo, which was originally intended to punish the 
Iraqi military machine, was hitting weak Iraqi people, mainly children. According to the 
U.N. from 500.000 to 1.000.000 children died as a direct result of the 12 years embargo.  
 
U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Denis Halliday offered his resignation in 
1998, protesting the ongoing “genocide” against the Iraqi people 69. According to him, 
the U.N. sanctions totally destroyed Iraq’s health system by preventing the import of vital 
medicaments and medical equipment, a step taken so that Iraq could not smuggle 
weapons under the cover of medical accessories. 
Dennis Halliday also complained about the poisoning of Iraqi water systems as a result of 
the war. This provoked the outbreak of typhoid epidemics and other disease transported 
by water. Although there was no official U.S. plan of poisoning Iraqi water systems, a 
1991 Pentagon secret document entitled “Iraq water treatment vulnerabilities” did explain 
in detail how the demolition of the water system (which took place during the war) and 
the maintaining of the embargo would result in disease outbreaks and consequently 
massive deaths 70.  
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When in 1995, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright was asked whether 
the 500.000 – 1.000.000 children’s deaths were worth keeping the sanctions in place, she 
plainly answered “It is a very difficult choice, but we think it’s the price to pay, yes it’s 
worth it” 71. The Iraqi people weren’t the only to suffer from the Gulf War long after it 
was over. Veterans that fought the ground phase of the war were hit by the Gulf War 
Syndrome. Unlike the Vietnam Veteran’s Syndrome, which is regarded as mainly a 
psychological disorder due to combat stress and defeat, the syndrome developed by 
veterans that returned from Iraq was physical, the most serious impact included birth 
defects (that hit 67% of the veteran’s offspring) or death due to cancer. Although the 
syndrome’s origins are still unknown, it is widely speculated that the use of depleted 
uranium in weapons and the compulsory anthrax vaccination could be the cause 72.  
The consequences of the Gulf War were very serious for all sides. It seems as if the Bush 
administration didn’t take into account the fallouts that would occur, or they were mere 
collateral damage expected in advance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Gulf War can be summoned in one single sentence: miscalculation by all 
sides. First and foremost by the Kuwaitis, who believed Saddam Hussein’s threats to be 
mere bellicose posing and chest pounding, that by throwing at him millions of dollars and 
erasing the Iraqi debt they would keep him at bay. They also chose the wrong moment to 
bargain debt for border recognition, thinking that after the war Iraq would be too weak 
and disorganized to truly represent a menace to the Emirate. It also underestimated 
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Saddam Hussein’s reaction to the pressure, which the Kuwaiti leadership was applying 
by deceasing oil prices. As a matter of fact, the war had weakened the economy but not 
the military juggernaut.  
The U.S. administration also assumed that Iraq was too disorganized to pose any 
immediate threat to its neighbors. Most policy makers were convinced that Iranian radical 
fundamentalism was far more threatening to the region and started dealing with Iraq too 
little and too late, miscalculating that the master of Baghdad would occupy, at worse, the 
bordering region and a couple of islands but never dare annex the whole of Kuwait.  
Finally, the gravest of all miscalculations was Saddam Hussein’s, the one that cost his 
country millions of lives, years of development and a crushing defeat from which it 
would not recover even after 15 years. Abroad, the Iraqi President’s steps actually 
backfired, bringing a new meaning to President Bush’s “New World Order” by 
strengthening Washington hawks’ position in the administration and turning much of the 
U.S. public opinion to the conclusion that even after the fall of the U.S.S.R. serious 
threats still remain. As a consequence, military expenditure boomed once again as it did 
every time a threat to American interests loomed in the horizon.  
 
In his farewell speech of 1961 President Dwight Eisenhower warned the U.S. people and 
political representatives of the danger a strong military lobby represented to American 
democracy, warning that “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military – industrial complex […] only an 
alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial 
and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security 
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and liberty may prosper together” 73 emphasizing the peaceful methods and goals that 
should forge the very basics of U.S. statecraft. These methods and goals were missing in 
the U.S. policy during the Gulf War mainly under the influence of hawkish advisors who 
sought to wage war at all costs, regardless of the long term consequences for both the 
Middle East and the United States. 
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Résumé 
 
 
 Neexistuje snad žádný stát ve Světě, o kterém se v roce 2005 mluvilo tolik jako o 
Iráku. Již od první války v Perském Zálivu, neboli Válka Irán – Irák, je prezident Saddam 
Hussain středem zájmu v oblasti mezinárodních vztahů. Tento konflikt poznamenal 
Blízký Východ na dlouhou dobu. Hned po ukončení tohoto dlouhého, krvavého a 
zhrocujícího konfliktu, se irácký diktátor vydal na agresivní cestu ústící ve válku 
v Perském Zálivu během které, se postavil proti němu celý svět. Co ho mohlo vést 
k takovému sebevražedného kroku? Irácký konflikt s Kuvajtem nebyl první v dějinách, 
předchozí byly vyřešeny diplomatickým způsobem. Proč se tedy tak nestalo i v roce 
1990? Z dnešního pohledu je postoj Západu jasný, avšak před invazí byl Irák považován 
za spojence v boji proti Iránu. Jak popisuje tehdejší francouzský Ministr zahraničních 
věcí Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Na Blízkém Východě nemají západní politiky „výběr 
mezi dobrem a zlem, ale výběr mezi hrozným a ohavným“ v tomto případě se přiklonili 
k Bagdádu. V tomto kontextu, proč došlo ke změně politiky ještě před samotnou invazí 
do Kuvajtu? Irák představoval nebezpečí pro celý region. Podle některých amerických 
analytiků, bylo na čase změnit dosavadní směr, který mohl udělat z Iráku nejmocnější 
vojenský stát na strategicky důležitém Blízkém Východě. Proto invaze do Kuvajtu byla 
vítanou příležitost zbavit se irácké hrozby. 
Celé spektrum politiků Spojených Států se k tomuto názoru nepřiklánělo. Během diskuze 
„utočit, či neútočit“ byli američtí politici rozděleni. Mnoho specialistů na Blízký Východ 
obecně, a Irák obzvlášť, odmítali vojenský útok jako řešení krize. Jaké měli argumenty? 
Jaký byl ohlas? Proč tento ohlas neměl žádný vliv? 
Když už se rozhodlo pro válku, proč neustoupil irácký agresor, když mu bylo jasné, že se 
proti jeho armádě chystá koalice, kterou nemůže za žádných okolností porazit? Odpověď 
na tuto otázku lze rychle vznést. Faktem je, že Saddam Hussain nabídl mnohokrát před a 
během Operace Pouštní Bouře, že vyklidí Kuvajt. Proto správná otázka zní, proč Spojené 
Státy všechny tyto plány odmítly? S mírovým řešením krize souhlasili Francouzi, Sověti, 
Arabské státy, vlastně všichni účastníci kromě USA a Velká Británie.  
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Dalším zajímavým momentem během krize je hlasování Rezoluce OSN a formování 
Koalice proti Iráku. Zde nesehrála roli všeobecná či svobodná vůle národu, nýbrž 
„Politika Diplomacie“ Státního Tajemníka James Bakera.  
Spojené Státy tak za sebou postavily širokou koalici, která jim pomohla rozehnat Iráckou 
armádu z Kuvajtu. I když plány zahrnovaly tzv. „chytré bomby“, které měly chirurgicky 
zničit své cíle, bylo nemyslitelné, že válka se muže odehrát bez masy obětí.  
Stal se pravý opak. V důsledku války a následujícího embarga Irák skončil na úrovni 
Rwandy či Libérie co se týče kvality zdravotní péče a sociální infrastruktury.  
Co vedlo nejvyspělejší, nejmocnější a demokratický stát zakročit takto razantně proti 
zemi, kterou v 80. letech považoval za spojence? 
